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Abstract 
 
When firms cluster in the same local labor market, they face a trade-off between the benefits of labor 
pooling (i.e., access to workers whose knowledge help reduce costs) and the costs of labor poaching 
(i.e., loss of some key workers to competition and the indirect effect of a higher wage bill to retain the 
others).  We explore this trade-off in a duopoly game.  Depending on market size and on the degree of 
horizontal differentiation between products, we characterize the strategic choices of firms regarding 
locations, wages, poaching and prices.  Our results show that co-location, although it is always 
efficient, is not in general the equilibrium outcome. 
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"Breakaways of workers - especially the very able workers - from existing organizations 
promote the development of new work as well as the creation of new organizations.  But 
breakaways are not good for the parent company; they undermine its efficiency.  To the 
company or companies in control, one of the advantages of a company town is that 
breakaways are not feasible there.  And in any settlement where breakaways are inhibited, 
by whatever means, the development rate must drop, although the efficiency of already 
well-established work is apt to climb." (Jacobs, 1969, p.97). 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Why do firms tend to cluster in some locations instead of spreading evenly over space?  In 
his pioneering discussion of the question, Alfred Marshall (1890) argued that firms cluster 
to economize on the transport of goods, people and ideas.  These three motives for 
economic agglomeration are also known as:  availability of intermediate/final goods, labor 
market pooling, and technological spillovers, respectively. 
 Following Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) in urban economics and Krugman 
(1991) in regional economics, a large fraction of the recent work on economic 
agglomeration focused on the first of the above arguments.  If shipping manufactured 
goods is costly, firms prefer to locate where the market for final goods is larger in order to 
save on transport costs.  This leads to a larger labor market, which in turn enlarges the 
market for final goods.  In Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990), this agglomeration force is 
limited by the scarcity of urban land, so that increasing population in a given city 
increases crowding and eventually offsets the gains from concentration.  In Krugman's 
benchmark, the same agglomeration force is limited by the cost of serving the immobile 
demand located in peripheral markets.  This type of model has received a lot of attention 
in the recent past and we shall not discuss it further (see Ottaviano and Puga, 1998, for a 
survey of the regional literature and Duranton and Puga, 2000, for a review of its urban 
counterpart). 
 Turning to labor market pooling, the existing literature is much thinner.  It tends 
overwhelmingly to favor labor market pooling as a strong motive for economic 
agglomeration and the formation of cities.  The argument runs as follows.  A larger pool 
of workers in an area makes it easier for firms to find workers with the characteristics they 
need.  Conversely, workers are more likely to find a job suited to their skills in a larger 
labor market.  In short, labor pooling improves the matching between firms and workers.  
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The forces limiting urban growth and the concentration of workers are usually taken to be 
the diseconomies of scale associated with increasing city size (higher commuting costs, 
urban congestion, higher land rent).  Helsley and Strange (1990) offer an elegant and 
sophisticated version of this argument. 
 Finally, localized technological spillovers are a popular motive for agglomeration.  
However, the argument is not as straightforward as it may seem.  If knowledge can flow 
freely out of the firms, why are the effects of spillovers localized?  To resolve this 
contradiction, Fujita and Ogawa (1982) propose a model with an information externality 
subject to distance decay.  The distance decay aims to capture the frictions associated with 
the spatial propagation of information.  But it remains unclear what these spatial frictions 
precisely are.  The second criticism of the spillover argument is that spillovers "leave no 
paper trail by which they may be measured and tracked" (Krugman, 1991, p. 53).  
Consequently, nothing prevents the theorists from assuming whatever they like.  Although 
subsequent empirical research showed that spillovers actually leave some paper trail 
through patent citation for instance and decrease with distance (Jaffe et al., 1993), the 
amount of evidence on localized spillovers to date is still very thin.  
 In this paper we wish to revisit these last two agglomeration motives.  We start 
with the premise that distance acts as a barrier for workers’ job mobility.  The basic thrust 
of our argument is then to assume that workers have access to crucial knowledge about 
their own firms, be it about products, production methods, marketing or management.  If 
we also (realistically) assume that this type of knowledge cannot all be patented and that 
exclusive labor contracts are not available, the clustering of firms on the same local labor 
market (i.e. labor market pooling) can lead to labor market poaching and the diffusion of 
knowledge.1  Since knowledge is partly embodied in workers, flows of workers can be 
associated with flows of knowledge so that poaching workers is a way for firms to raise 
their productivity.2  In turn, this has a knock-on effect on product market competition 
between firms.  When choosing to locate close to their competitors, firms face a tradeoff 
between the benefits of labor market pooling and the costs of labor market poaching.  The 
benefits of pooling rest with the opportunities for a firm to hire workers whose knowledge 
                                                 
1 The assumption that workers' propensity to change jobs in the same local labor market is greater than their 
propensity to move between local labor markets, quite naturally justifies the localized aspect of spillovers so 
that this need not be justified by an exogenous decay function as in the earlier literature. 
2 According to Arrow (1962, p. 615) “No amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable 
commodity of something as intangible as information” and then he adds that “mobility of personnel among 
firms provides a way of spreading information”. 
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was gained in other firms and can be profitably adapted internally.  The costs of poaching 
are twofold.  Competitors can have access to the firm's own knowledge by poaching from 
its workforce.  This makes them more competitive on the product market.  Alternatively, 
this firm can reduce poaching by raising the wage of its strategic workers but this comes 
at the cost of a higher wage bill. 
To explore this tradeoff more precisely and to show how and when the labor 
market at the local level can act as a conduit for spillovers, we propose a four-stage game 
between duopolistic firms producing differentiated goods.  First, firms need to choose a 
location and set-up their production facility.  Workers involved with a firm at this stage 
have access to some of its specific knowledge.  In the second stage, firms commit to a 
wage for these “strategic” workers.  When firms are located together, it is then possible in 
the third stage for a firm to poach workers from the other firm - this can be done by 
offering them a higher wage than they were promised.  The knowledge of poached 
workers can then be transferred to their new employer.  In the last stage price competition 
takes place. 
 Depending on market size and the degree of horizontal differentiation between 
products, we characterize the strategic choices of firms regarding locations, wages, 
poaching and prices for our duopoly game.  Our results show that co-location, although it 
is always efficient, is not in general the equilibrium outcome.  In particular, firms tend to 
separate when the conditions of perfect competition are approached.  As rivalry 
intensifies, the incentives to raise the wage of their strategic workers increase while 
poaching decreases.  This means a higher cost of co-location because of higher wages, as 
well as lower benefits of co-location because of smaller flows of workers and knowledge 
across firms.  When the costs of poaching are higher than the benefits of pooling, firms 
locate separately.  Thus, despite the advantages of labor market pooling, firms may choose 
strategically to locate in different local labor markets in order to avoid labor market 
poaching.3  Hence, the labor pooling argument for agglomeration is not as straightforward 
as envisioned in the previous literature.  Further, this source of spillovers we propose here 
may be fairly attractive from an empirical point of view as the movement of workers 
                                                 
3 There are examples of firms relocating some of their strategic facilities (R&D centers, trial production 
plants, etc) away from famous specialized clusters.  For instance, according to Jackson (1997, p. 138) Intel 
in the 1980s started to limit its workforce in Silicon Valley:  “Nothing was more frustrating than spending 
months helping an operator to learn how to work a sensitive and unpredictable piece of machinery, only to 
see that same operator take a job down the street at National or Fairchild for a dollar more per hour.[…] 
Each time it built a new fab outside the Valley, [Intel] could feed off a fresh labor pool, with fewer 
competitors to lure its best people away”. 
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between firms usually leaves some paper trail.  Finally, this implies that labor market 
pooling and spillovers can no longer be viewed as distinct motives for agglomeration 
since technological spillovers may travel through the labor market.  
 This paper relates to the small amount of literature in labor economics on workers’ 
flows across firms.  A first strand, following Rosen (1972), views occupational mobility 
as the result of optimal investment decisions made by workers over their life-cycle.  In a 
competitive labor market, where different jobs tying together work and learning are 
available, younger workers optimally choose jobs that offer low wages but fast acquisition 
of general human capital.  When reaching maturity, these workers recoup their investment 
by switching to occupations with less learning opportunities.  In this type of model, more 
experienced workers get a higher wage because they have acquired more general human 
capital making them more productive.4  Pakes and Nitzan (1983) propose an alternative 
two-period framework where a scientist needs to match with an entrepreneur to develop a 
project.  At the end of the first period, the information about the project is disclosed to 
both parties.  Then Pakes and Nitzan (1983) show that it is never profitable for the 
scientist to part from the entrepreneur and create a rival firm since the sum of the rents in 
a duopolistic market is lower than that of a monopoly, a joint-profit effect.  The 
fundamental difference between this second type of model and the human capital 
approach is that more experienced workers get a higher wage, not because of higher 
productivity, but because defecting to a competitor could harm their employer.  A very 
similar mechanism is at work in Motta et al. (2001) who study the decision of a single 
firm to export or to go multinational.  
 We clearly stand in this second tradition.  Notwithstanding the spatial focus, there 
are two main differences with the Pakes and Nitzan (1983) approach.  First we consider a 
continuum of workers and show that the joint-profit effect is not robust to this variation.  
The reason is that receiving a large fraction of a duopoly rent is better than a small 
fraction of a monopoly rent.  This gives a strong incentive for workers to defect.  The 
other major difference is that we consider a model of reciprocal poaching instead of a 
situation with an incumbent and an entrant.  Such an assumption may be better suited to 
analyze the interactions between existing firms.  The latter have the advantage of being 
empirically easier to observe than potential entrants. 
                                                 
4 Recent developments in this strand of research include Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) and Franco and 
Filson (2000).  The former propose a theory of the diffusion of knowledge between managers and 
employees, whereas the latter are concerned by breakaways of employees to create their own firm. 
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 Last, our model also contributes to the large literature on strategic investments (see 
Tirole, 1988, chapter 8, for a survey).  Labor poaching is a form of strategic investment 
that allows a firm to lower its marginal cost before product market competition takes 
place.  However, the cost of this investment is also endogenous and strategically 
determined in a previous stage by the other firm through its choice of wage.  This wage 
decision can be viewed as a "counter-investment" since higher wages make poaching by 
the other firm more expensive.  Even before that, firms can strategically decide not to 
enter this poaching game by locating on a separate local labor market. 
 The rest of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the empirical 
relevance of our main assumptions.  In Section 3, we present a game in which firms 
compete both for each other's workers and on the product market.  In Section 4, the game 
is solved for the prices, poaching, and wages decisions.  We explore the location decision 
of firms and the welfare in Section 5.  The last section contains some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Worker Flows and Knowledge Flows in Local Labor Markets 
 
Before presenting the details of the model we wish to empirically substantiate its two 
main components. 
 Our first stylized fact is that workers often move between firms and that these 
flows are mostly local.  Direct evidence about this can be obtained from French 
employment data.  The data, extracted from the 1996 and 1997 Déclarations Annuelles de 
Données Sociales (DADS) database of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques (INSEE), contains the employment area, the occupation and the sector for 
their main job of all French employees that were born in October in even years.  
Continental France is fully covered by 341 employment areas, whose boundaries are 
defined on the basis of daily commuting patterns.5  The firms are classified by sector 
according to level 36 of the Nomenclature d’Activités Française of INSEE.  Occupations 
are classified according to level 37 of Catégories Socio-Professionelles of INSEE.  
Among all occupations we selected only 6 of them:  Scientists, Executives (commercial 
and administration), Engineers, Technical Personnel, Foremen, Specialized manufacturing 
                                                 
5 Given that within Greater Paris (Ile-de-France), changes of job do not usually involve workers changing 
residence and that commuting across employment areas is easy, we decided to lump together the 26 
employment areas forming Greater Paris. 
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workers.  These six groups, we believe, are those whose mobility across firms is most 
likely to be associated with transfers of knowledge. 
We first computed the intra-occupation turnover rate, that is, for each occupation, 
the fraction of workers who changed employer among those employed in the same sector 
during the two years.6  Next, conditional on workers having a different main employer in 
1996 and in 1997, we computed the fraction of workers in each occupation that remained 
in the same sector and the same employment area, the fraction that remained in the same 
employment area but changed sector and the fraction that remained in the same sector but 
changed employment area.  The results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Spatial and Sectoral Mobility of French Workers in 1996-97 
 Scientists Executives Engineers Technicians Foremen Skilled 
workers 
All 
Intra-occupation 
turnover rate 
9.6% 10.1% 11.7% 8.7% 8.2% 9.9% 9.8% 
Same area, same 
sector 
43.4% 39.2% 46.9% 42.7% 48.7% 43.1% 43.4% 
Same area, 
different sector  
16.2% 32.7% 28.9% 33.0% 25.7% 32.3% 30.4% 
Different area, 
same sector 
30.3% 13.0% 9.6% 8.7% 12.8% 8.9% 11.4%  
Different area, 
Different sector 
10.1% 15.1% 14.7% 15.6% 12.8% 15.7% 14.8% 
 
Among French workers who remain in the same occupation, around one in ten 
changes employer every year.  Regarding sectoral and geographical mobility, the results 
are remarkably consistent across occupations except for scientists, who are slightly more 
mobile.  Around 45% of workers that change jobs remain in the same employment area 
and in the same sector.  Another 30% remain in the same area but in a different sector. In 
other words, when they change employer, around 75% of skilled French workers remain 
in the same employment area.  The levels of geographical mobility implied by these 
figures are very low given that the average French employment area is equivalent to a 
circle of radius 23 km.  
The French case is not exceptional.  At a slightly larger level of aggregation and 
for all workers, the literature on internal migrations systematically reports low gross inter- 
                                                 
6 Given the focus of our model, we only consider the population of workers who have been employed in the 
same occupation over two consecutive years.  This is likely to yield lower turnover rates than those in the 
literature, which are typically computed relative to the population in the labor force at large.  See Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1998) for the US and Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for Europe. 
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regional flows (see Greenwood, 1997, for a survey).  Gross inter-regional flows of less 
than 2% a year seem to be the norm in Europe. 
 Our second major assumption is that workers flows are also knowledge flows.  
Many case studies strongly support the idea that workers, when they change employers, 
come with knowledge about their former employer and that this knowledge can be 
profitably used by their new employer.  Saxenian [1994] made a convincing case that the 
incessant turnover of skilled labor between firms in the Silicon Valley was closely linked 
to the area's success.  In this paper we would like to discuss briefly another highly 
revealing cluster, the British Motor Valley, which has been recently investigated by Henry 
and Pinch (1997a, 1997b) and Pinch et al. (1997). 
 The British motor sport industry clusters heavily in the Thames Valley around 
London where it directly employs over 50,000 workers, most of them highly skilled.  It is 
by far the leading motor sport industry at the world level.  It produces sport cars in the 
upper-end of the segment:  touring cars, racing cars, Formula One cars, and even Indy 
cars, although all the Indy car races take place in the US.  In these markets, the dominance 
of the British Motor Valley is nearly absolute.  If one breaks down the making of a 
Formula One into four main parts (design, base, chassis and engine), 9 teams out of 14 
had three or four of these parts made in the British Motor Valley in 1997.  Only one team 
had no presence at all. 
 As Henry and Pinch (1997a, p.14) observe “the history of Formula One is full of 
radical innovations that spread throughout the sport.  The diffusion is often rapid because 
it is difficult to keep these innovations secret for long.  One reason for the rapid diffusion 
of ideas is the fact that the drivers, designers and engineers move from team to team, 
taking with them considerable knowledge of how things are done in rival teams”.  
Elsewhere, Henry and Pinch (1997b, p.5) also note that “knowledge is spread by the rapid 
and continual transfer of staff between companies within the industry.  Our mapping of 
the career histories of 100 designers/engineers in the industry revealed a move, on average 
every 3.7 years and a total of 8 moves in the career in the industry.  …..As personnel 
move, they bring with them knowledge and ideas about how things are done in other 
teams, helping to raise the level of knowledge throughout the industry.  Whilst this may 
not change the pecking order within the industry, this 'churning' of personnel raises the 
knowledge base of the industry as a whole”.  Finally by using interviews, Pinch et al. 
(1997) show that this continual churning of staff is recognized by key people in the 
industry to be enormously beneficial for the industry as a whole as well as for the 
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individuals concerned if not always by teams loosing key workers.7 
 Although hard evidence regarding these issues is scarce because of the difficulties 
associated with measuring these phenomena, we believe that these case studies are 
representative of a wider trend where workers flows generate flows of knowledge across 
firms.  
 
 
3.  The Model 
 
Consider a partial equilibrium model with two differentiated goods, each produced by a 
different firm.  Let 1 and 2 denote these two firms, which sell their goods in a common 
and perfectly integrated market.  We also assume two different locations I and J, each 
constituting a separate local labor market.  These labor markets are completely segmented 
with workers being immobile between them.  In each labor market, there is an infinite 
supply of ex-ante homogenous labor at a wage W . 
 The two firms play a four-stage game. 
 
Stage 1 - Location 
 
Each firm choose a location, I or J, where to produce its goods.  We speak of co-location 
whenever both firms locate either in I or J.  After their location decision, firms must hire 
an exogenous quantity L  of workers.  These workers are referred to as strategic workers.  
Hiring those workers is necessary for the firms to set-up their production facilities.  
Without loss of generality, we can assume this is done at no direct (wage) cost.  But, when 
setting up production facilities, workers acquire part of the internal knowledge of the firm.  
We assume firms cannot charge workers for this knowledge.8  Neither can this knowledge 
be patented.  Finally, exclusive long-term labor contracts are not available.  
 This stage can be thought of as the history of the firms.  When it ends, firms are 
ready to operate in their location.  They are also loaded with strategic workers who have 
                                                 
7 See also En Route F1 (November 1999, page 44):  “On the technical side, a driver who has decided to 
leave will be stopped from doing any private testing.  Indeed, teams will wait until the end of the season 
before testing anything new that is to appear on the car the following year.  There is no question of the 
driver who is leaving knowing the least details of how anything works.” 
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access to their specific knowledge. 
 
Stage 2 - Wage 
 
In view of the production stage, each firm commits to a wage jW w+  (j = 1,2) for its own 
strategic workers.  This wage is paid only if the worker works for the firm at Stage 4.  (In 
what follows, the wage premium, jw , is referred to as the strategic wage.)  The promise 
of a higher future wage is the only way a firm can protect itself from poaching when firms 
co-locate.9 
 
Stage 3 - Labor poaching 
 
Depending on what the firms played in Stage 1, two cases must be distinguished.  
§ When both firms are in the same location, they can poach on each other's strategic 
labor.  Firm i, by proposing a wage, iwW + , can hire as many of firm j's strategic 
workers as it likes provided it offers them a wage higher than that promised by the 
other firm:  ji WwW w+³+ .10  When it poaches il  strategic workers with 
L£l£ i0  from the other firm, firm i can use their knowledge to reduce its own 
costs.  For simplicity, there is no direct cost for firm j when it loses il  strategic 
workers.11  On the other hand, we assume that adapting the knowledge embodied 
in these il  workers is costly for firm i.  
§ When firms are not in the same location, poaching is impossible because labor is 
immobile. 
                                                                                                                                                  
8 Allowing firms to charge strategic workers at the beginning of Stage 2 would just impact on the outcome 
of Stage 1 by neutralizing effects on wages at this stage only.  By a straightforward backward induction 
argument, the other effects would remain the same.  We believe that it is more realistic to proceed as we do. 
9 Most of the real world mechanisms used by firms to keep their workforce use delayed payments (stock 
option, seniority system, etc).  The alternative is to write restrictive labor contracts preventing defection to 
competitors.  Such 'restrictive covenants' must however be reasonable in the eyes of the law.  Furthermore 
the courts in most countries are protective of an employee's freedom to continue to sell his or her services 
after finishing employment in the face of an ex-employer seeking to restrict that liberty.  
10 We assume a sequential (and reciprocal) auction process for strategic workers.  The poached firm decides 
on a strategic wage first.  The poaching firm then decides on a quantity.  Note that the poacher realistically 
benefits from a second mover advantage.  But, it must also be noted that the poached firm sets its second 
period wage forming rational expectations about the poacher’s behavior at Stage 3.  Alternative auctioning 
processes on strategic workers are left for future work. 
11 Having such a cost would only reinforce our results. 
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Stage 4 - Price 
 
Each firm hires its non-strategic labor, il , and price competition in the common market 
takes place between the two firms. 
 Let us now present the details of the model.  The utility function of the 
representative consumer is quasi-linear and quadratic: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) MqqqqqqMqqU ++--++= 2221212121 2
1
1,, ba , (1) 
where iq  is the consumption of the good produced by firm i, M is a homogeneous good 
which is used as numéraire, 0>a  and 10 <b£ .  Maximizing the utility function in (1), 
subject to the budget constraint RqpqpM £++ 2211  with R  the income, leads to the 
following linear demand functions: 
iji ppq 22 1
1
11
1
bb
b
b
a
-
-
-
+
+
+
= , 21,i =     ji ¹ . (2) 
The parameter a  can be interpreted as reflecting the market size or strength of the 
demand, whereas b  is an inverse-index for the degree of differentiation between the two 
goods.  In the particular case where 0=b , firms are in a monopoly position on their 
markets, whereas the limit case 1=b  is equivalent to Bertrand competition with 
homogenous goods.12  All the results derived below depend only on these two parameters.  
The concavity of the utility function guarantees that the demand derived in equation (2) 
defines a maximum.  
 Turning to production, assume a constant labor requirement per unit: 
iii qcL = ,            (3) 
where ic  is the labor requirement per unit (or unit labor requirement) and iL  is firm i’s 
total labor force.  Three different kinds of workers must be distinguished:  (i) remaining 
(or unpoached) strategic workers in quantity ( )jl-L , (ii) workers poached from firm j in 
quantity il , and (iii) non-strategic workers in quantity il .  Consequently total 
employment in firm i is: 
( ) iiji lL +l+l-L= .          (4) 
The knowledge of poached workers can be used to reduce the firm's unit labor 
                                                 
12 See Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) for further comments on these preferences. 
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requirement.  Unit labor requirement reduction decreases with the number of poached 
workers: 
ii acc l-= , (5) 
with c  the initial level of marginal cost and a  an index of knowledge transferability.  For 
consistency we assume L³ ac , so that firms always face positive unit labor requirements.  
For demand to be positive when price is equal to marginal cost, we also impose 
( ) Wc 1+a£ .  
 We assume that transferring knowledge is costly and rising in the amount of 
knowledge to be transferred.  This cost also depends on the degree of differentiation 
between products.  Competing forces may be at play here.  On the one hand, when 
products are close substitutes, they may use very similar technologies so that the potential 
to learn from each other may be low.  On the other hand, very differentiated goods may 
use very different technologies.  This may limit how much firms can adapt from each 
other.  The cost of transferring knowledge takes the following form: 
Cost of transferring knowledge ( ) 2iT lb= . (6) 
The quadratic term in equation (6) implies that there are decreasing returns to scale in the 
poaching technology, since a unit reduction in labor requirement is more costly when 
many workers have already been poached and it raises with il .13  This cost, ( )bT , is 
allowed to depend on the degree of differentiation between the products and can be 
decreasing as well as increasing in b .  As we shall see, some of our results depend on the 
shape of ( ).T . 
 The general resolution of the model implies that the proportions of poached 
workers, the profits when the two firms locate in the same labor market relative to when 
the firms locate separately, as well as the relative prices and strategic wages, are function 
only of b , ( ) ( )2Lb aWT  and ( ) ( )L-a+ aWWc1 .  Consequently, without loss of generality, 
we can to normalize L , c , a , and W  to unity.14  Thus, the rest of the analysis considers 
only the function ( ).T  and two parameters:  a  reflecting market size and b  the inverse 
                                                 
13 This assumption of quadratic costs together with linear demand is standard in the strategic R&D 
literature.  See Leahy and Neary (1997) for more on this. 
14 The derivation of this result is omitted here.  The normalizations of the number of strategic workers and 
initial costs are just choices of units for inputs and outputs.  The normalization of a amounts to normalizing 
minimum marginal costs to zero.  Together with the normalization of the wage, this amounts to re-scaling 
both firms’ profits and consumer’s utility. 
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degree of differentiation between products.  After these normalizations, equations (3) to 
(6) yield: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 2111 iiiijiiii Tlwqp lbllwp --+--+-= . (7) 
In this expression, the first term is the total revenue, the second is the cost of retaining 
strategic workers, the third is the cost of poaching workers from the other firm, the fourth 
is the cost of non-strategic workers, and the fifth is the cost of transferring knowledge. 
 
 
4.  Prices, Poaching and Wages Under Co-Location 
 
Throughout we assume that the cost of transferring knowledge, ( )bT , is sufficiently large.  
When this cost is low, a firm can rely only on high wages to retain its workers.  This may 
be very costly.  In this case, it can be worthwhile for this firm to deviate by undercutting 
wages and let the other firm poach all its workers.  The absence of such a profitable 
deviation is guaranteed by the following sufficient condition for the existence (SCE) of 
sub-game perfect Nash-equilibria in pure strategies:15 
( ) ( )b
b
b
-
-
>
120
5
T . (SCE) 
For the sake of clarity, condition (SCE) is assumed to hold in what follows.  The behavior 
of the model when (SCE) does not hold is discussed in Section 4.4.  The current section 
solves for the last three stages of the game (wages, poaching and prices).  The location 
stage is analyzed in Section 5 together with welfare.  Two specific examples are also 
developed in the same section for illustrative purpose. 
 
4.1  Stage 4:  Price competition 
 
Firm i maximizes its profit with respect to its price, subject to demand and feasibility 
constraints.  At this stage, it takes as given the pricing behavior of the other firm, the 
number of poached workers, the unit labor requirement, and the strategic wages.  Its 
program is thus:  
                                                 
15 See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix 2. 
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After simplification, the first-order conditions of program (8) imply: 
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It can be easily checked from the second-order conditions that these three equations define 
a sub-game perfect Nash-equilibrium.  Inserting equations (9) to (11) into the profit 
function (7) yields: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 21, iiijijiii Twcc lbllwp ----P= , (12) 
with ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )( )bbbb
bbbba
+-+-
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1122
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22
22
ij
jii
cc
cc . (13) 
The interpretation of equation (12) is straightforward.  The first term is the revenue 
associated with the unit labor requirements ic  and jc .  The second term is the cost of 
retaining strategic workers.  The third term is the cost of poaching and finally the last term 
is the cost of transferring knowledge. 
 
4.2  Stage 3:  Poaching decision 
 
When the firms co-locate, poaching may take place.  In order to poach workers, firm i 
must offer a strategic wage above that of firm j.  Obviously, it will set jiw w=  regardless 
of the number of workers it poaches.  Inserting this and equation (5) into equation (12) 
implies the following program: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2
10
1,Max iijjijii TR
i
lblwlwll
l
----
££
 (14) 
with ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2, jiijii BAR llblall -++º , ( ) ( )222 14
1
bb --
ºA  and 22 bb --ºB  (15) 
The revenue ( )jii ,R ll  increases with the size of the demand a  and decreases with the 
substitutability between products, b .  It also increases with the number of poached 
14 
workers, il , since poaching leads to a reduction in unit labor requirement.  Because it 
lowers costs, poaching leads to lower prices.  This raises both total sales and the firm’s 
market share.  Competition in the final good market also implies that the firm's revenue 
declines with poaching by the other firm, jl . 
From the first-order condition of program (14), ( ) 02 =lb-w-l¶¶ ijii TR , it is 
possible to define the interior best-response in poaching: 
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Turning to the second-order conditions, it can be noted that Fii 2
22 -=¶lp¶ .16  It can be 
verified that if condition (SCE) is satisfied then 0>F  for [ ]10,Îb , so that the second-order 
conditions for this stage are satisfied.  Following directly from (14), we can now write 
Lemma 1: 
 
Lemma 1.  Under (SCE) and co-location, firm i’s best response at Stage 3 is: 
· ( ) 1=wwll jijBRi ,, , if  
D
B
D
F j
j
2
w
-
b
a+-£l , 
· ( ) ( )jijjijBRi ,,ˆ,, wwll=wwll  , if  
D
B
D
B
D
F j
j
j
22
w
-
b
a<l<
w
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b
a+- , 
· ( ) 0=wwll jijBRi ,,  ,if  jjD
B
l£
w
-
b
a
2
. 
As the best-response functions for each player are in three parts to account for corner 
solutions in the poaching decision, nine regions must be considered for Stage 3 (but only 
six when taking pairs of symmetric configurations into account).  These regions are 
represented in Figure 1.17 
                                                 
16 The shorthand notations A,B,D and F are only functions of b  and ( )bT .  They allow us to reduce 
drastically the length of the expressions below. 
17 Figure 1 is drawn assuming 0>w , which is not necessarily the case. 
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More precisely, these regions are defined by: 
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It is also useful to denote the intersection of the interior best-responses given in Lemma 1 
by: 
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as well as the semi-interior intersections, when 1=l j  and 0=l j  respectively: 
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Simple calculations then imply: 
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Lemma 2. Under (SCE) and co-location, the sub-game equilibria for each region at 
Stage 3 are: 
· ( ) ( ) 1122211 =wwl=wwl ,, **  in region (i), 
· ( ) ( )jji*i , wl=wwl  and ( ) 1=wwl ij*j ,  in region (ii), 
· ( ) 0=wwl ji*i ,  and ( ) 1=wwl ij*j ,  in region (iii), 
· ( ) 0=wwl ji*i ,  and ( ) ( )iij*j , wl=wwl  in region (iv), 
· ( ) ( ) 0122211 =wwl=wwl ,, **  in region (v), 
· ( ) ( )21211 wwl=wwl ,ˆ,*  and ( ) ( )12122 wwl=wwl ,ˆ,*  in region (vi). 
This lemma can be summarized by Figure 2. 
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To gain more insights, it is possible to look more precisely at the comparative statics of 
the poaching decision.  
 
Proposition 1. Under (SCE) and co-location, in the poaching sub-game equilibrium, 
poaching  
· increases with the firm’s own strategic wage, ( ) 0³w¶wwl¶ iji*i , , 
· decreases with the rival's strategic wage, ( ) 0£w¶wwl¶ jji*i , , 
· increases with demand, ( ) 0³a¶wwl¶ ji*i , , 
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· decreases with the substitutability between products, ( ) 0£b¶wwl¶ ji*i , , for a 
symmetric equilibrium, unless the cost of knowledge transmission sharply 
decreases with b . 
See Appendix 1 for a proof. 
From program (14), the marginal incentive for firm i to increase its poaching on 
firm j’s labor force is ( ) ijii TR lb-w-l¶¶ 2 .  This quantity decreases with jw  and jl 18, 
whereas it does not depend on the firm's own wage.  As a consequence, firm i's interior 
best-response for poaching (equation 16 and Lemma 1) declines with jw  and jl  and is 
independent from iw .  The intuitions are the following.  An increase in strategic wage by 
the other firm makes a reduction in unit labor requirement more expensive and this 
reduces best-response poaching.  The effect of poaching by the other firm is more subtle.  
An increase in jl  implies an increase in firm i’s relative marginal costs, which, in a price 
competition game, lowers its incentives to reduce them.  In other words, the numbers of 
poached workers in the two firms are strategic substitutes.  As regards own strategic 
wages, best-response poaching does not depend on them since the firm takes poaching by 
its rival as given.  However, own wages impact on poaching in the sub-game equilibrium 
through indirect effects.  A higher iw  reduces jl  which in turn increases firm i's 
poaching because of strategic substitutability. 
The incentive to increase poaching also increases with a  since a stronger demand 
increases the pay-off to lower marginal costs.19  Thus, best-response poaching also 
increases with demand through a gross profit effect.  In equilibrium a higher demand also 
increases poaching by the other firm.  In combination with strategic substitutability, this 
decreases the incentive to poach.  However, straightforward calculations from Lemma 2 
show that the direct effect dominates so that poaching increases with a  in the sub-game 
equilibrium. 
The effect of the degree of differentiation on the incentive to poach is ambiguous.  
First, when products become closer substitutes, firms have less incentive to reduce their 
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relative marginal costs and thus to poach.  When b  increases, differences in marginal 
costs translate into smaller differences in profits.20  This is a rivalry effect whereby 
competition is fiercer and profits lower.  This effect of increased rivalry is reinforced by 
the cost of transferring knowledge when ( ) 0>b'T .  In this case, as products are less 
differentiated, knowledge becomes more difficult to transfer between firms so that the 
incentive to poach is even weaker.  By contrast, when ( ) 0<b'T , a larger b  makes it easier 
for firms to achieve a unit reduction in marginal costs and thus favors poaching.  This 
second effect dominates only when ( ).T  decreases sufficiently sharply.  These direct 
effects determine the best-responses (equation 16 and Lemma 1) comparative statics. 
Some indirect equilibrium effects are also present as b  symmetrically impacts on the 
incentive of the other firm to poach.  Because of strategic substitutability, these indirect 
effects go against the direct ones.  However, in equilibrium, the direct effects of b  
dominate the indirect effects working through jl , as stated in the last item of Proposition 
1.  
 
4.3  Stage 2:  Setting wages for strategic workers  
 
At this stage, the firms may use the wage of their strategic workers to prevent poaching.  
In the strategic wage sub-game, the firm’s program is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jiijiijijjiijjjiii TR
i
wwlbwwlwwwlwwwlwwl
w
,,,1,,,Max
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 (20) 
where ( )ji*i ,wwl  and ( )ij*j ,wwl  are given in Lemma 2. 
Using the envelop theorem, the first-order condition reduces to: 
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. (21) 
The first term in equation (21) is the marginal gain of increasing iw .  It is the product of 
two negative partial derivatives and is thus positive.  A higher iw  leads to less poaching 
by the other firm which increases revenue because of lower relative costs.  As indicated 
by the last two negative terms in brackets in equation (21), a higher iw  also raises costs by 
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19 
making retained workers more expensive and increasing their number.  Note that the 
strategic wage determines profit through two channels only:  directly through the wage 
bill and indirectly through its impact on the other firm's poaching.  All the effects of the 
strategic wage on the firm's own poaching cancel out, since poaching is chosen at the 
following stage so as to maximize profit for any strategic wage. 
We can now outline the derivation of the sub-game equilibrium for this stage (a 
full derivation of the proposition below is given in Appendix 2).  First, when the market is 
large, i.e. when the condition a³a , whereby: 
         
( )
1
2
-
b
ºa
AB
T
, (22) 
is satisfied, the maximization in equation (20) can be shown to imply that any maximum 
is such that w£w1  and w£w2 .  Thus, any pair ( ) ( )ww£ww ,, 21  is in equilibrium and 
leads to the poaching decisions:  ( ) ( ) 1122211 =wwl=wwl ,, ** .  This defines a continuum of 
full poaching equilibria, FPW . 
Second, for intermediate market size, i.e., when the condition a<a<a , whereby: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]DFDFBAB
DFDF
--++
-+º
22
2
22 bb
a , (23) 
is satisfied, the first-order conditions of program (20) for firms 1 and 2 can be shown to 
imply: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
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where 0>wˆ .  This leads to the following poaching: 
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where 10 <l< ˆ .  We face here a second type of equilibrium for the sub-game.  We call it 
partial poaching interior, PPIW .  At this equilibrium, strategic wages are strictly positive 
and poaching is strictly between zero and one. 
Finally, for small market size, i.e. when a£a , the constraint 0³wi  is binding, so 
that the solution of program (20) for firms 1 and 2 is 021 =w=w , and the corresponding 
(interior) poaching is: 
( ) ( ) ( )DF
BD
ji +
==
b
a
ll 0,00,0 ** . (26) 
We speak here of a partial poaching corner equilibrium, PPCW , since poaching is positive 
20 
and below unity with zero strategic wages.  Last, it can be verified that if condition (SCE) 
is satisfied, so is the second-order condition at this stage.  We obtain Proposition 2 (for 
which a complete proof is given in Appendix 2): 
 
Proposition 2. Under (SCE) and co-location, the sub-game perfect equilibria in Stage 2 
are such that: 
· PPCW : 021 =w=w
**  and ( )( )DFBD** +ba=l=l 21 , if a£a , 
· PPIW : w=w=w ˆ** 21  and l=l=l ˆ
**
21 , if a<a<a , 
· FPW :{ } [ ]wÎww ;; ** 021  and 121 =l=l ** , if a£a . 
Note that the equilibrium is symmetric and unique for a<a .  In Figures 1 and 2, these 
sub-game equilibria correspond to the origin, which is in region (vi) when a£a , for 
PPCW , to a point on the bisecting line in region (vi) for PPIW , and to all the points in 
region (i) for FPW . 
The intuitions for these results are the following.  When market size (a ) is small 
enough, rivalry is weak and firms do not attempt to prevent poaching, so that 0=w*  and 
0>l* .  When a  increases, so does *l , whereas *w  remains zero until a first threshold 
(a ) is met.  Then, it becomes worthwhile for firms to raise their strategic wages to limit 
poaching due to increasing rivalry.  As a  keeps increasing, so do wages and poaching, 
until the feasibility constraint 1£l*  becomes binding.  This defines a second threshold a , 
above which the poached firm is indifferent across all strategic wages which lead to full 
poaching by the other firm. 
In the case of partial poaching interior equilibrium, PPIW (i.e., a<a<a ), the 
comparative statics works as follows. 
 
Proposition 3. Under (SCE) and co-location, when both poaching and strategic 
wages are interior: 
· strategic wages increase with demand, 0³a¶w¶ *i , and with the substitutability 
between products, 0³b¶w¶ *i , unless the cost of knowledge transmission sharply 
increases with b . 
21 
· poaching increases with demand, 0³a¶l¶ *i , but decreases with the substitutability 
between products, 0£b¶l¶ *i , unless either a  is low and the cost of knowledge 
transmission sharply decreases with b  or a  is high and the cost of knowledge 
transmission sharply increases with b . 
See Appendix 3 for a proof. 
The comparative statics of equation (21) indicates that in absolute terms the 
negative revenue effect of more poaching by the other firm increases with market size and 
decreases with the degree of differentiation between products (the effect is stronger when 
both a  and b  are high).21  This is because differences in marginal costs between firms 
are relatively more important when demand is strong or when the degree of differentiation 
between products is low.  Next, recall that firms gain from higher strategic wages because 
they discourage poaching by the other firm.  This deterrent effect of strategic wages upon 
poaching does not depend on a  and increases in absolute value with b  (the impact of 
higher strategic wages on poaching is larger when products are closer substitutes).22  In 
sum, from a revenue perspective, firms have stronger incentives to increase their strategic 
wages when the demand and substitutability parameters are high. 
Still from the comparative statics of equation (21), changes in a  or b  also impact 
on the rise in costs caused by an increase in strategic wages.  An increase in the size of the 
market reduces the number of non-poached workers (Proposition 1), and thus the 
corresponding cost.  This goes in the same direction as the revenue effects described 
above.  Consequently and without ambiguity, a higher demand increases the best-response 
in strategic wage.  As regards b , the story is more intricate.  From Proposition 1, poaching 
decreases when products become less differentiated provided ( ).T  is not too strongly 
decreasing in b , which increases the number of retained workers.  Moreover, the effect of 
strategic wages on poaching (the second term in the marginal cost of increasing iw  in 
equation 21) increases with b , as just mentioned.  Thus, an increase in b  increases both 
the gain and the costs of increasing iw , which makes the total effect on the best-response 
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ambiguous.  
Furthermore, strategic wages in Stage 2 are strategic substitutes.  Thus the indirect 
equilibrium effects are opposite to the direct ones that influence the best-responses.  As a 
consequence, the impacts of a  and b  on the equilibrium strategic wages are a priori 
ambiguous.  However, Proposition 3 shows that strategic wages always increase with 
demand, a . Strategic wages also increase with b  provided ( ).T  does not increase too 
strongly.  In this case, the direct rivalry and deterrent effects dominate the cost effects and 
the indirect effects.  By contrast, when the cost of transferring knowledge strongly 
increases, poaching in Stage 3 strongly decreases with b , which reduces the incentives to 
increase strategic wages.  Using strategic wages to further reduce poaching becomes less 
critical.  Strategic wages may even decrease when products become more substitutes:  the 
cost effect and the indirect effects dominate. 
Regarding the impact of a  and b  on the equilibrium number of poached workers, 
three effects play a role:  the direct effect holding strategic wages constant at Stage 3 (see 
Proposition 1), and the two indirect effects working through strategic wages, which are 
detailed in the previous paragraphs and which act in opposite directions.  First, market 
size has a positive effect on poaching:  the direct effect of Stage 3 (poaching increases 
with a  holding wages fixed) and the indirect effect due to the own strategic wage ( iw  
increases, which increases poaching) dominate the indirect effect going through the rival's 
wage ( jw  increases, which decreases poaching).  Turning to the inverse-degree of 
differentiation, b , the effects are again more intricate.  In most cases, poaching decreases 
with b :  the direct effect of Stage 3 (poaching decreases with b  holding wages fixed) and 
the indirect effect going through the rival's wages ( jw  increases, which decreases 
poaching) dominate the indirect effect due to the own strategic wage ( iw  increases, which 
increases poaching).  However, when a  is low and the cost of transmitting knowledge, 
( ).T , strongly decreases, the direct effect is weak and poaching may even increase as 
stated in Proposition 1.  Similarly, when a  is high and ( ).T  strongly increases, poaching 
and strategic wages are low and strategic wages increase less, and may even decrease with 
b .  As a consequence, in these two specific cases, poaching increases with the 
substitutability between products. 
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4.4  Some intuitions when (SCE) is not verified 
 
In the ( )T,b  space, condition (SCE) slopes upwards as b  increases and admits 1=b  as 
vertical asymptote.  The second-order conditions of Stages 2 and 3 also slope upwards 
with the same vertical asymptote.  The second-order condition of Stage 2 lies between 
(SCE) and the second-order condition of Stage 3.  Thus, for (SCE) to be satisfied for all 
b s, we then need ( ).T  to be sufficiently increasing.  When condition (SCE) is not 
satisfied, three different regions must be distinguished. 
Immediately below (SCE), there is first a region where both second-order 
conditions for Stages 2 and 3 are satisfied.  In this region, there are no particular 
difficulties as shown in Appendix 2.  However, computations show that there is no sub-
game equilibrium at Stage 2 in pure strategies for some values of a .  Non-existence arises 
here for the following reason.  At the unique interior solution for strategic wages and 
poaching as derived from the first-order conditions, a firm can profitably deviate by 
lowering its strategic wage so that it no longer poaches anyone.  This raises the firm's 
costs and lowers its market share but this loss is in some instances more than offset by a 
lower wage bill.  Such a situation cannot be in equilibrium because this deviation gives 
the other firm an incentive to lower its wage as well. 
Below, lies a second region where the second-order condition for Stage 3 is 
satisfied, whereas that for Stage 2 is not.  Any equilibrium in pure strategies for the wage 
sub-game must thus be in a corner.  However, neither symmetric nor asymmetric corner 
situations can in general be sustained as equilibria.  In this region b  is large relative to a  
so that strong rivalry implies high strategic wages.  These wages are so high as to make 
the deviation in strategic wages, 0=w , profitable.  The other corner situation with 
strategic wages equal to zero cannot be in equilibrium either.  Because of strong rivalry, 
one firm is always tempted to raise its strategic wage to prevent poaching.  Finally, no 
equilibrium can be sustained with asymmetric corner situations where one firm sets its 
wage to a low level and does not poach whereas the other sets its wage at a high enough 
level and poaches all the workers from the other firms.  In this case, the former firm finds 
it profitable to raise its wage to reduce poaching by the latter.  The best-response from this 
firm is then either to raise its wage further or to reduce it dramatically.  Thus, there is no 
24 
sub-game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in this region.23 
Even further below, lies the last region where both second-order conditions are not 
satisfied.  For some parameter configurations, the solution of the poaching sub-game 
implies either full poaching or no poaching for both firms.  This last situation can be 
shown never to be in equilibrium when solving the wage sub-game.  For the other 
configurations, there is co-existence of two asymmetric equilibria involving full poaching 
for one firm and no poaching for the other.  Thus, in this region, multiple sub-game 
equilibria are possible at Stage 3.  This implies that the complete game can be solved only 
using game theory refinements and by studying mixed strategies, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
 
5.  Location and Welfare Issues 
 
We can now turn to the location decision.  When firms locate separately, they cannot 
poach due to the workers' immobility, which implies 021 =l=l
** .  Thus, at Stage 2, they 
optimally set their strategic wages such that 021 =w=w
** .  From (12) and (13), the firms’ 
profit when they locate separately are: 
( )
( ) ( )bb
bappp
+-
-===
12
1
2
2
21
SSS . (27) 
 
5.1  Stage 1:  Location decision 
 
We can now define ( ) ( ) SC ,, p-bapºbaF  where Cp , the profit when firms co-locate, is 
either FPp , PPIp  or PPCp  (i.e., the profits under the full-poaching, the partial-poaching 
interior or the partial-poaching corner equilibrium of Stage 2), depending on a  and b .  
When ( ) 0³baF , , firms want to co-locate and two location equilibria are possible: ( )I,I  
and ( )J,J .  Both equilibria imply co-location.  When ( ) 0<baF , , firms do not want to co-
locate and two other location equilibria are possible: ( )J,I  and ( )I,J .  Both equilibria 
imply dispersion. 
                                                 
23 This is a standard feature of Bertrand games with variable marginal costs.  See Gabszewicz and Thisse 
(1999) for a general discussion on this issue.  
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We now turn to the determination of the sign of ( )baF , .  For simplicity we assume 
that under full-poaching, the firms' preferred equilibrium is played ( 021 =w=w
** ).  The 
results depend on the size of the market, the degree of differentiation between the products 
and the cost of transferring knowledge. 
For a large market, that is when a³a , which leads to the full-poaching 
equilibrium of Stage 2, it can be verified from equations (12), (13) (22) and (27) that: 
( ) ( ) 02 2 ³a-a=baF AB, . (28) 
The profits of co-location are always higher than those of separation.  Consequently the 
firms always co-locate when the market is large. 
For a market of intermediate size, that is when a<a<a , which leads to the 
partial-poaching interior equilibrium of Stage 2, we obtain from Proposition 2 and 
equations (12), (13) and (27): 
( ) =F ba, ( ) ( )
( ) ( )bb
blla
+-
-+
12
1ˆˆ2
2
( ) 2ˆˆ lbw T-- . (29) 
Since from equations (24) and (25), lˆ  and wˆ  are linear in a , the expression ( )baF ,  is 
quadratic in a  with a positive coefficient for 2a .  The condition ( ) 0=baF ,  can be shown 
to be either positive whatever a  and b  or to have two positive a -roots.  In this latter 
case, both roots are either (i) greater than a , or (ii) only the smallest one is between a  
and a , or (iii) both are between a  and a .  Thus, three cases are possible:  (i) the two 
firms always locate together, (ii) the two firms locate together for low a  and separately 
for high a , or (iii) the two firms locate together for low a , separately for intermediate a , 
and together again for high a .  
Finally, for a small market size, that is when a£a , which leads to the partial 
poaching corner equilibrium of Stage 2, it is verified from Proposition 2 and equations 
(12), (13) (15), (17) and (26) that: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
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This expression is positive only when 13 -<b  and ( )( ) ( )222 222 b-³b-b-b ABT , which 
does not depend on a .  Thus, when the market is small, the two firms co-locate only 
when b  is not too high, i.e., when the degree of differentiation is high enough and when 
the cost of transferring knowledge, ( )bT , is large enough relatively to b .  This leads to 
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Proposition 4: 
 
Proposition 4. If (SCE) is satisfied and: 
· a£a , the firms co-locate if and only if ( )bT  is large enough relative to b , 
· a<a<a , the firms co-locate either for any a , or only if a  is close enough to a , or 
for a  close enough to both a  or to a , but not in between. 
· a£a , the firms always co-locate. 
Hence the result we want to emphasize in this paper is that firms can strategically decide 
to locate separately despite the lower unit labor requirements associated with a common 
location.  The effects of market size, a , as regards this possible outcome of separate 
locations, SW , are subtle.  When a  is below a first threshold ( )a , poaching increases with 
market size but strategic wages do not.  Thus, there is clearly an incentive to co-locate 
when a£a .  Above this threshold, both poaching and wages increase with a .  A higher 
a  then leads to both lower labor units costs and a higher wage bill.  The overall effect on 
profit is ambiguous and can be non-monotonic as a  increases:  firms may not co-locate 
for high or intermediate values of a .  Then for a market larger than a , firms poach all of 
their strategic workers from each other.  There is continuum of equilibria for the strategic 
wage but it makes sense for the firms to coordinate on the equilibrium with strategic 
wages equal to zero.  This implies a low wage bill, large costs reduction and thus a strong 
incentive to co-locate. 
The impact of products substitutability on co-location cannot be determined 
without specifying the cost of transferring knowledge function ( ).T , since the comparative 
statics on poaching and strategic wages depends on its slope in the Stage 2 sub-game.  
However, separate locations should occur when rivalry on the product market is strong (b  
close to 1), which is verified on both examples presented in Section 5.3.  As stated in 
Proposition 3, strong rivalry induces both low poaching and high strategic wages, at least 
for ( ).T  not too strongly increasing or decreasing.  This implies that the costs of 
preventing others from poaching can be above the gains from poaching, when the 
differentiation between products is low, which leads firms to locate on different labor 
markets. 
Another way to interpret these results is to think in terms of forces of 
agglomeration versus forces of dispersion.  Our force of agglomeration is the opportunity 
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for firms to improve their technology and lower their costs through the poaching of 
strategic workers from another firm.  To our knowledge, this is a novelty with respect to 
the existing literature where the agglomeration forces are either driven by spillovers for 
which no microeconomic foundations are given or, when there is a labor market, by a 
better or safer matching between firms and workers.  Our agglomeration force is strong 
when the costs of transferring knowledge are low (because of cheaper cost reductions), 
when the products are very differentiated (because firms can capture a large fraction of the 
surplus accruing from lower costs and because rivalry is weak) and when the market is 
large (because cost reduction takes place over a larger quantity of output).  Our dispersion 
force stems from strategic interactions between rival firms who have incentives to push up 
their strategic wages to discourage the other firms from poaching from their workforce.  
This dispersion force is strong when the cost of transferring knowledge are low (because it 
makes poaching more attractive and thus forces firms to react by raising their wages), 
when differentiation between products is low (because the surplus accruing from lower 
costs goes to consumers and because higher rivalry results in higher wages to prevent 
poaching) and when market size is neither small nor big (because in both cases firms do 
not use strategic wages to prevent poaching either because the market is very small or 
because it would not prevent full poaching).  When the dispersion force dominates the 
agglomeration force, firms prefer to locate separately.  
 
5.2  Welfare  
 
We can now look at the welfare properties of our equilibria in order to state if all possible 
benefits of knowledge exchanges are captured or not.  Total surplus is the sum of 
consumers’, workers’ and producers’ surpluses: 
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Proposition 5 is derived in Appendix 4: 
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Proposition 5. The optimum implies at 
 
Stage 1:  common location, 
Stage 2:  any strategic wages, 
Stage 3:  optimal poaching given by: 
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Stage 4:  marginal cost pricing. 
To avoid any deadweight loss, the optimum obviously involves marginal cost pricing.  
Since strategic wages only change the distribution of the surplus, they are irrelevant here.  
Furthermore, due to the cost-reduction arising from exchanging workers, the optimum 
also involves co-location.  Regarding poaching, three cases are possible.  When the costs 
of transferring knowledge are high, the optimum implies that not all strategic workers are 
exchanged.  By contrast, when ( )bT  is sufficiently small, the optimum involves full-
poaching.  When ( )bT  is intermediate, a third case can arise.  It involves an asymmetric 
cost-reduction whereby unit labor requirements do not change in one firm and are lowered 
as much as possible in the other.  Asymmetric cost reduction is optimal when market 
demand is not large enough to justify the maximum cost reduction for both firms and 
when the two products are close enough substitutes that it makes sense to invest in only 
one product to avoid duplicating investment. 
Turning now to the comparison between the optimum and the equilibrium, note 
first that, due to imperfect competition, the equilibrium price given by equation (9) is too 
high with respect to the optimum.  Conditional on the firms co-locating, the poaching sub-
game equilibrium may imply too much or too little poaching.  This ambiguous outcome is 
the result of contradictory forces.  First, equilibrium prices are above marginal costs.  This 
reduces demand and thus the incentive for cost reduction.  Second, firms raise the wage of 
their strategic workers.  This makes poaching more costly - another force limiting cost 
reduction.  However, there is also a rivalry effect whereby firms try to lower their costs 
relative to those of their competitors.  This force pushes towards too much cost reduction - 
a frequent outcome in models of investments under market rivalry.  Regarding location, 
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firms' choices may also be sub-optimal in equilibrium.  Having separate locations for 
firms in equilibrium is a very inefficient outcome since it prevents any form of poaching. 
Thus, the model predicts a tendency for sub-optimal dispersion. 
 
5.3  Two examples 
 
To sharpen the intuitions, it is worth exploring two examples for which ( ).T  is specified.  
As made clear above, the results depend on ( ).'T .  We illustrate our results with the 
following two cases:  ( ) 1=bT  (the cost of knowledge transmission does not depend on the 
degree of differentiation between products) and ( ) ( )b-=b 11T  (the closer substitutes the 
products are, the more difficult is the reduction of unit labor requirements by learning 
from rivals). 
Consider first ( ) 1=bT . Condition (SCE) can be shown to be satisfied for b£b  
with 830.»b .  Applying Propositions 2 and 4, we can represent graphically the 
equilibrium depending on the two parameters a  and b  (see Figure 3).24  Following 
Proposition 3, straightforward but tedious algebra shows that when the two firms share the 
same location, 0³a¶l¶ *i , 0£b¶l¶
*
i , 0³a¶w¶
*
i , and 0³b¶w¶
*
i .  Note also that firms 
tend to locate on separate labor markets only when the degree of differentiation is low 
enough (Proposition 4). 
Figure 3 
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24 In the case of full poaching, we assume the firms' preferred equilibrium is chosen in both examples.  
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The intuition for these results follows directly from Propositions 2 and 4.  Due to the 
strategic and rivalry effects on the gross profit and on the wage bill, a larger market (a 
higher a ) raises the incentive to lower costs and thus to poach.  Above a first threshold 
(a ) and to counteract this, firms raise their strategic wages, which reduces poaching.  
These indirect effects are however not sufficient to cancel the direct one and poaching 
increases.  If the substitutability between products is sufficiently high, profits under co-
location may become lower than under separate locations when market size increases and 
firms choose different locations.  Above a second threshold (a ), there is full poaching and 
strategic wages go to zero, so that a common location is obtained whatever the market size 
and differentiation parameters. 
An increase in b  makes strategic effects and rivalry stronger.  This leads to higher 
wages and less poaching in equilibrium.  In turn, this increase in b  reduces the incentive 
to co-locate.  Thus, as products become closer substitutes, a common labor market 
becomes less attractive with a greater incentive to separate, and firms choose a common 
location only for b  low enough.  Increased rivalry has a second effect.  As b  increases, 
strategic wages may increase so much as to make a deviation profitable.  For b  large 
enough, it is actually profitable for a firm not to try to retain its strategic workers and 
propose them very low strategic wages.  There is no equilibrium in pure strategies in this 
case. 
Regarding welfare, when firms locate separately, the equilibrium is sub-optimal.  
Optimal poaching would be strictly positive for these values of the parameters.  Moreover, 
when firms locate in the same place, FPW  is optimal, but poaching is too low for both 
PPIW  and PPCW  because firms do not receive all the surplus created by lower marginal 
costs. 
When ( ) ( )b-=b 11T , the condition (SCE) is satisfied for any b .  The equilibria, 
derived from Propositions 2 and 4, are represented in the ( )ba,  space in Figure 4.  From 
Proposition 3, when the two firms share the same location, 0³a¶l¶ *i , 0£b¶l¶
*
i , 
0³a¶w¶ *i , and 0£b¶w¶
*
i . 
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There are two major differences with the previous case:  first, the equilibrium 
wage decreases with b  and, second, the equilibrium can be characterized for all parameter 
values.  The reason for these differences lies in the fact that the costs of transferring 
knowledge, ( )bT , increase with b .  These rising costs of transferring knowledge more 
than offset the increase in the incentive to poach.  Consequently, firms can lower the 
strategic wage they propose to their workers, while poaching simultaneously decreases.  
As a corollary, when b  increases, no opportunity for wage under-cutting arises and the 
existence of the sub-game equilibrium is not called into question.  Separate locations are 
still observed when the substitutability between products is high and for intermediate 
demand size.  Finally, the welfare results are the same as in the previous example.  
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
To explore some of the issues raised by the labor market pooling argument, we proposed a 
model where firms, which ultimately compete on a differentiated product market, choose 
first a location.  Then they hire workers that may later be poached by another firm if co-
location arises, while they may themselves poach workers from the other firm.  
Anticipating this, firms may increase their wages to limit poaching.  Our results show that 
co-location, although it is always efficient, is not in general the equilibrium outcome.  In 
particular, it is when the conditions of perfect competition are approached that firms 
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separate.  As rivalry intensifies, poaching decreases while firms raise the wage of their 
strategic workers.  This means a higher cost of co-location because of higher wages, as 
well as lower benefits from co-location because of smaller flows of workers and 
knowledge across firms.  When the costs of poaching are higher than the benefits of 
pooling, firms choose to locate separately. 
This model allows us to propose some alternative explanations regarding the 
functioning of some well-known clusters, namely Silicon Valley and Route 128.  
Saxenian (1994) attributes the success of Silicon Valley and the relative decline of Route 
128 to cultural differences between East and West in the US.  In a nutshell, she claims that 
more open-minded Californians let their workforce hop from firm to firm, which yields 
important benefits for Silicon Valley as a whole.  By contrast, the ‘culture’ in the East is 
to try to retain workers as much as possible.  Our model also accepts the premise that 
workers’ mobility across firms is socially beneficial but it suggests a different explanation.  
Firms in Route 128 are mostly in the market for mainframes/mini-computers where the 
degree of differentiation is low, whereas software/internet activities, which dominate in 
Silicon Valley, are intrinsically more differentiated (high b  versus low b ).  Furthermore, 
demand over the last 15 years has been much stronger in the software market than in the 
market for mini-computers (high a  versus low a ).  Consequently, in the light of our 
model, it may be optimal for firms in Route 128 to prevent poaching and for firms in 
Silicon Valley not to prevent poaching.  
Beyond this suggestive re-interpretation of a famous case, our model generates a 
set of predictions that may guide future empirical work.  The first prediction is that wages 
for ‘strategic’ workers should be higher in areas where firms in the same industry 
cluster.25  Second, firms’ productivity and productivity growth are predicted to increase 
with equilibrium workers’ flows across firms.26  Third, the model also predicts that the 
flows of workers between firms should be more important when firms cluster.  Fourth, the 
comparative statics on market size also indicates that when a sector is booming, flows of 
workers across firms within the sector should be higher.  Fifth, the comparative statics on 
product differentiation is less clear-cut but it nonetheless shows that the tendency for firms 
to cluster should increase with the degree of product differentiation within the industry.  
                                                 
25 By contrast, the traditional insurance interpretation of labor market pooling implies that workers are 
happy to accept lower wages where there are more potential employers 
26 Davis and Haltiwanger (1998) indicate that a positive correlation between workers flows and productivity 
growth is observed in US data but the direction of causality remains unclear. 
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Sixth, like in human capital models, the wage is also predicted to increase steeply over 
time for key strategic workers.27  This latter effect is not due to any form of general 
human capital accumulation, but on the contrary, it is caused by knowledge that one firm 
tries to protect and that others may obtain by hiring key workers.  We hope these 
predictions will be subject to empirical scrutiny in the future.  
A few unresolved issues and caveats are left for future theoretical work.  Our 
model so far considers only two firms.  The extension to many firms is important as a 
greater number of firms may change the terms of the trade-off between pooling and 
poaching.  In particular the benefits to pooling may increase with the number of firms 
(more opportunities for firms to learn when there are more firms) whereas the cost of 
poaching may also decrease with the number of firms (through a dilution of the rivalry 
effect as workers leave to different firms).  Second, alternative auctioning processes 
regarding strategic workers could be considered.  For instance, one could think of using a 
simultaneous auction process where firms would decide how much to spend to retain 
strategic workers and to poach workers.  A last important extension regards viewing the 
initial recruitment of strategic workers as an endogenous investment.  This paper 
considers that only the diffusion of knowledge is endogenous, whereas of course it is both 
its generation and its diffusion that must ultimately be understood in the same framework. 
 
                                                 
27 See Møen (2000) for evidence on this point. 
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Appendix 1:  Proof of Proposition 1 
 
When (SCE) is satisfied, B, F, D and (F-D) are positive and do not depend on a .  The 
comparative statics of poaching with respect to a , iw  and jw  is thus directly obtained 
from equations (18) and (19) which give poaching at Stage 3 for region (vi) and regions 
(ii) and (iv), respectively.  In the other regions, poaching is constant.  Turning to the 
comparative statics of poaching with respect to b  in the symmetric case ( w=w=w ji ), 
note that equation (18) reduces to: 
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where ( )( ) 02 >b¶¶+b¶b+¶- DBA .  Thus, as long as ( ).T  is not too strongly decreasing 
in b , 0
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.  Since bBD  also decreases with b , the number of poached 
workers decreases with b  in this case.  A strong decrease of ( ).T  with b  may on the 
contrary induce an increase in ( )DF +1  that offsets the decrease of bBD , in which case 
poaching may increase with b . 
 
 
Appendix 2:  Proof of Proposition 2 
 
In this proof, we loosely use the term "equilibrium" for "sub-game perfect equilibrium in 
pure strategies in Stage 2".  Let us proceed in steps. 
 
Step 0. When (SCE) is satisfied, ( )1ww  (resp. ( )1ww ) is strictly increasing and strictly less 
steep than ( )2ww  (resp. ( )2ww ) in the ( )21 ww ,  space (as drawn in Figures 1 and 2).  
Simple computations show that ( )1ww  and. ( )1ww  are strictly increasing if 0>F/D .  The 
conditions ( )1ww  less steep than ( )2ww  and ( )1ww  less steep than ( )2ww  in the ( )21 ww ,  
space reduce to ( ) 022 ³- FDDF .  It is then easy to show that these two conditions are 
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satisfied when (SCE) holds. 
 
Step 1.  There is no equilibrium in regions (iii), (iv) or (v). 
From Lemma 2, we have ( ) 0=wwl ij*j ,  in regions (iii), (iv) or (v) so that firm i’s profit is 
equal to: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )2**2*2 ,,,2 jiijiijijiii TBA wwlbwwlwwwwlbap ----+= , (A3) 
with ( ) 0=w¶wwl¶ iji*i ,  in these regions (Lemma 2).  It is then straightforward that 
0<w¶p¶ ii , which prevents the existence of any equilibrium in these regions. 
 
 
Step 2.  There is a unique equilibrium in region (vi) for a non-empty set of parameters 
( a<a<a ) and it is symmetric. 
 
Step 2.1.  (SCE) implies that the second order conditions of both Stages 2 and 3 are 
satisfied. 
Program (20), evaluated at ( ) ( )21211 wwl=wwl ,ˆ,*  and ( ) ( )12212 wwl=wwl ,ˆ,*  leads to the 
best-responses: 
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assuming that the second-order condition, which reduces to 032 222 >-b- DAFF , holds.  
Since this inequality holds whenever (SCE) is satisfied, the second-order conditions of 
Stages 2 and 3 are satisfied.  Note also that under (SCE), firm i's best-response regarding 
its strategic wage is decreasing with firm j's strategic wage. 
 
Step 2.2.  In region (vi), there is a unique and symmetric equilibrium candidate. 
Since the second-order conditions are satisfied, any equilibrium in region (vi) is given by 
the intersection of the best-responses (A4) of the two firms.  This intersection is unique 
since these conditions are linear in ( )21 ww , .  It is also symmetric.  Straightforward 
computations show that this candidate, PPIW  (for Partial Poaching Interior equilibrium), 
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is defined by w=w=w ˆ** 21  and l=l=l ˆ
**
21  with wˆ  and lˆ  given in equations (24) and (25) 
of the main text. PPIW  is in interior equilibrium if and only if 10 <l< ˆ , 0>wˆ , and if no 
firm, by changing iw , can profitably deviate to another region.  Steps 2.3 and 2.4 check 
these conditions. 
 
Step 2.3.  The existence conditions 10 <l< ˆ  and 0>wˆ , reduce to a<a<a , where a  and 
a  depend only on (.)T  and b . 
Straightforward computations show that the condition 0>lˆ  is always verified.  Moreover, 
the condition 1<lˆ  reduces to a<a  with a  defined in equation (22) of the main text.   
Similarly, the condition 0>wˆ  reduces to a<a  with a  defined in equation (23) of the 
main text. 
 
Step 2.4.  No firm can profitably deviate from PPIW  to another region a<a<a . 
a) From step 0, no unilateral deviation from region (vi) can take place in regions (i) and 
(v). 
b) We check now that no firm i can choose iw  so as to profitably switch to region (ii). 
· Firm i cannot profitably deviate in the part of region (ii) where ji w<w .  Since firm j 
poaches all its strategic workers, its profit does not depend on iw  in this region and it 
is equal to the profit obtained at ( )jww .  By continuity, this is equal to the profit when 
iw  tend towards this line in region (vi).  This profit is however lower than the 
maximized profit in region (vi), at the equilibrium candidate PPIW . 
· In the part of region (ii) where ji w>w , it can be shown that firm i's profit is concave 
in iw .  For any jw , the strategic wage that satisfies the first-order condition of profit 
maximization in this region is given by: 
( )( )
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A necessary condition for the deviation to be profitable is ( ) dˆˆ w£ww-1 .  Simple 
computations show that this condition implies a£a , which is impossible from step 2.2 
since PPIW  exists only when a<a<a . 
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c) Finally, no deviation to region (iv) is profitable.  The proof is similar to that for region 
(ii). 
· Firm i cannot profitably deviate in the part of region (iv) where ij w<w .  By the same 
arguments as used in step 1, firm i's profit strictly decreases with its wage in the part 
of region (iv) where ij w<w .  By continuity, it is thus lower than the profit firm i 
obtains in region (vi) at ( )jww .  This profit is however lower than the maximized 
profit for the region (vi) at the equilibrium candidate PPIW . 
· Turning to the part of region (iv) where ij w>w , it can be shown that firm i's profit is 
concave in iw .  For any jw , the strategic wage that satisfies the first-order condition 
of profit maximization in this region is given by: 
( )( )
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Note that ddwˆ  is not necessarily positive when (SCE) is satisfied.  When 0£wddˆ , the 
strategic wage for firm i when deviating is 0. 
d) However, the pair ( )( )ww ˆ,,ˆMax dd 0  does not necessarily belong to region (iv).  A necessary 
condition for firm i to profitably deviate is to have ( ) ( )ww£w - ˆ,ˆMax dd 10 .  Some 
computations show that this condition is equivalent to a£a , where a  is a function of b  
and T .  When (SCE) is satisfied, a<a  so that no profitable deviation can occur when 
a£a . 
e) When (SCE) is satisfied, we just proved that no deviation to region (iv) is profitable, 
thus no deviation to region (iii) is profitable either, since firm i's profit does not depend on 
jw  in region (iii), and is equal, by continuity, to the profit it obtains in region (iv) when 
iw  tends towards w . 
a), b), c), d) and e) guarantee that no deviation is profitable from PPIW  to any other region 
when a<a<a .  Finally, this region is never empty since it is easy to show that a<a . 
 
Step 3.  There is a unique symmetric corner equilibrium when a£a . 
Clearly, if a£a , that is if 0£wˆ , simple calculations show that there is an equilibrium 
candidate PPCW  (for Partial Poaching Corner equilibrium) with 021 =w=w
**  and 
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( )( )DFBD** +ba=l=l 21  (which is obtained by inserting 021 =w=w **  in the definition of 
the equilibrium candidate for region (vi) given in Lemma 2).  Note that a£a  guarantees 
10 <l< *i .  Moreover, from step 2.3, we also know that no firm can profitably deviate by 
changing its strategic wage.  Thus, a£a  ensures that PPCW  is in equilibrium. 
 
Step 4.  There is a continuum of equilibria in region (i) for a non-empty set of parameters. 
 
Step 4.1.  Any point in region (i) is an equilibrium candidate. 
First note that region (i) is feasible (strategic wages are non-negative) if and only if w£0 .  
When this condition is satisfied, any point in region (i) may be in equilibrium, since the 
profit of any firm does not depend on its strategic wage (all workers are poached).  Let 
FPW  (for Full Poaching equilibrium) denote one of these equilibrium candidates where 
[ ]wÎw ,* 01 , [ ]wÎw ,* 02  and 021 =l=l ** . 
 
Step 4.2.  No firm can profitably deviate from FPW  to another region when a£a . 
a) From step 0, no unilateral deviation from region (i) can take place in regions (iv), (v) 
and (vi). 
b) By the argument used in step 1, no firm would find profitable to switch to region (iii), if 
we prove that it is not profitable to switch to region (ii).  Thus, we just have to check 
possible profitable deviations to region (ii). 
c) Firm i can only deviate in the part of region (ii) where ij w<w .   As in step 2, in this 
region, firm i's strategy is given by (A4).  A necessary condition for firm i to profitably 
deviate from FPW  to region (ii) is thus dwˆ<w .  Direct computations show that this 
condition is equivalent to a<a .  Thus, there is no profitable deviation when a£a . 
d) It can be checked that when a£a , then w<0 .  This proves that region (i) is not empty 
in this case. 
From a), b), c) and d), we can conclude that a continuum of full poaching equilibria exists 
in region (i), which is not an empty set when a£a . 
 
Step 5.  There is no equilibrium in region (ii). 
It is sufficient to prove that at least one firm deviates from any point belonging to region 
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(ii) that we decompose in the part where a£a  and the one where a<a . 
Step 5.1.  There is no equilibrium in region (ii) where ij w£w , when a£a . 
In step 4.2, it has been observed that w£wdˆ  when a£a .  Thus, when a£a , firm i can 
profitably deviate to either region (i) (when w£w j ) or region (vi) (when jw<w ). 
 
Step 5.2.  There is no equilibrium in region (ii) where ij w£w , when a<a . 
For any iw  such that w£w£w i  in region (ii), firm j's profit does not depend on jw , since 
firm i poaches all its labor force, whatever jw .  By continuity, this profit is equal to the 
profit firm j obtains in region (vi) at ( )( )ii , www .  If at this point, firm j’s profit increases 
with jw , firm j profitably deviate to region (vi).  However marginal profit is not 
necessarily positive, even when PPIW  exists (when a<a ): firm j's best-response is 
decreasing, but its intersection with ( )jww  could be below ( )( )ii , www .  However, simple 
computations show that the derivative of firm j's profit in ( )( )ii , www  is indeed positive 
when a<a . 
 These five steps lead to Proposition 1. 
 
 
Appendix 3:  Proof of Proposition 3 
 
From equation (24) and (25), the poaching and strategic wage in equilibrium PPIW  can be 
written as: 
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with ( ) ( )DFDFH -+-= 2 , ( ) ( ) ( )( )DFDFBABK -b-+b+= 22 22 , 
( )22 222 b-+-= ADFDFL , ( )( )DFDFM -+= , FABN 2= .  
Straightforward computations show that K, L and N are positive, which implies that both 
strategic wages and poaching increase with a . Regarding b , we have: 
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It is easy to show that:  0>b¶¶-b¶¶ LHHL . When 0³b¶¶-b¶¶ LKKL , this implies: 
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When 0<b¶¶-b¶¶ LKKL , using the fact that ( ) NMLˆ -£aÛ£l 21 , we have: 
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Similarly, 0<¶¶-¶¶ TLHTHL , but 0>¶¶-¶¶ TLKTKL . Using 
( ) NMLˆ -£aÛ£l 21 , this implies: 
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Thus, when ( ) 0£.'T  or when ( ).T  is not too strongly increasing, (A8)-(A11) imply: 
0³b¶w¶ˆ . 
Turning to poaching, from (A7), we have: 
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Using a comparable majoration than for (A13), we obtain: 
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However, regarding the second term, we have: 0>¶¶-¶¶ TLMTML , but 
0<¶¶-¶¶ TLNTNL , and no majoration or minoration can be obtained for 
( )TLNTNLTLMTML ¶¶-¶¶a+¶¶-¶¶ .  This expression is positive for low a  and 
negative when a  is high.  The comparative statics on poaching with respect to b  is 
directly obtained from this. 
 
 
Appendix 4:  Proof of Proposition 5 
 
Using (1), (3), (4), (5), (7), total surplus can be simplified into: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2221221122212121 11
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The sufficient first-order conditions in 1q  and 2q  imply: 
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41 
It is immediate that (A15) is equivalent to marginal cost pricing.  Insert (A15) into (A14) 
and take the first-order conditions with respect to il  to get: 
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If ( )( ) 112 2 >b-bT , the first-order conditions are sufficient to define a global maximum and 
we find ( )( )( )1121,Max21 -b+a=l=l T**** .  When ( )( ) 112 2 £b-bT , the first-order 
conditions no longer define a global maximum.  The optimum must be a corner solution.  
The case 021 =l=l  must be ruled out because of (A14). 01 =l-=l ji  can be shown to 
be a local maximum when ( )b-b£a 1 .  Further, it can be checked that 121 =l=l  is a 
maximum when ( )( )( ) ( )b-b-b+-b³a 1121 2T .  The comparison of these two local 
maxima implies that 121 =l=l  is a global maximum when 
( )
( )b-
b-+-b
>a
12
1212 2T
. 
Finally regarding Stage 1, it is immediate that at the optimum the two firms must be 
located in the same labor market.  These results are summarized in Proposition 5. 
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